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COMMENTS

ILLINOIS' NEW SECOND GENERATION, SECOND
STEP TAKEOVER AMENDMENT: CONTINUING
THE TREND OF STATES' TAKEOVER
REGULATIONS
The Illinois legislature recently added Sections 7.85 ("Amendment")' and 8.85 ("Directors' Duties Provision") 2 to the Illinois
Business Corporation Act.' These sections were added in the wake
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Edgar v. MITE,4
that the prior Illinois Takeover Act5 was unconstitutional.' This new
Amendment also seeks to regulate takeovers. Rather than unconstitutionally regulating the first step of the takeover, however, it regulates the second or freeze-out merger step. This type of second step
regulation is fairly new in state regulations.7
The Amendment is part of a new trend in state statutes, which
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 17.85 (1985). The Amendment contains supermajority
voting requirements and fair price requirements that must be met before a merger or
consolidation with a majority shareholder or corporation can be achieved. See infra
notes 71-78 and accompanying text (outlining the provisions of the Amendment).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, V8.85 (1985). The Directors' Duties Provision outlines
the Board of Directors' duties to be followed in carrying out their responsibilities. See
infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (outlining section of the statute).
3. Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 1.01-17.05
(1985).
4. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, 137.521 (Supp. 1980) (Repealed 1983).
6. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646.
7. See Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland FairPrice Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266, 280 n.76 (1984) (noting how until very recently all takeover regulations involved the regulation of tender offers). Fourteen states have
adopted fair-price statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374A to 33-374c (West 1987);
Act of July 2, 1987, ch. 87-257, 1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 517-40 (West) (to be codified at § 607); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to 14-2-234 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
7.85 (Smith Hurd 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 271A.396-398 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132-12:134 (West 1986); MD. CoaPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to
3-603 (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775-450.1784 (West 1987); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to 79-25-7 (1986); Act of April 23, 1987, ch. 88 § 1, 1987 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 70-73 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to § 55-79); PA. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon 1986);-VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 13.1-728 (1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (1986); and WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West
1986).
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protects minority shareholders and discourages hostile takeovers
through regulating the second step of a takeover.8 Illinois' adoption
of this Amendment demonstrates Illinois' policy that hostile takeovers are not necessarily beneficial to the target corporation or to
the economy and, therefore, should be regulated to protect the target corporation's shareholders. 9
This comment, after setting out a brief historical background"0
and outlining the major provisions of the Amendment," seeks to establish the constitutionality of the Amendment. 2 It also discusses
the possible conflicts the Amendment might pose to established corporate policy."3 Additionally, it discusses some potential difficulties
that the Directors' Duties Provision could pose. 4
I.

CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: HISTORICAL FACTS AND LAWS

Corporate takeovers 8 have become a highly publicized' and
regulated area of corporate law.' 7 A large number of takeovers are
8. Pennsylvania's adoption of a second step takeover statute showed the growing demand that the advisability of hostile tender offers be judged by their impact
upon society as a whole and upon state and communities in particular. Newlin &
Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to
Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111, 122-23 (Nov. 1984).
9. The regulation of the second step of a takeover is intended to protect minority shareholders by ensuring that a fair price is paid for their shares. Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671,
697 (Feb. 1985) (discussing the reasons for the Maryland Fair Price Legislation). See
Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 8, at 122 (noting that the Pennsylvania Act, while serving as a deterrent to a substantial number of potentially undesirable takeovers, produces a fairer result to all shareholders).
10. See infra notes 15-67 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
15. A corporate takeover occurs when one corporation attempts to acquire another corporation through gaining a control of the majority of outstanding voting

stock. R. JENNINGS & R.

BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS

1145 (5th ed. 1979).

16. Takeover attempts have resulted in some highly publicized cases. See, e.g.,
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49 (1975).
17. Securities transactions in the first stage of a takeover are governed by both
federal and state legislation. See Warren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV. 495 (1984). The federal government
regulates tender offers through the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1982). Most states have also regulated the tender offer stage of takeovers. Virginia
enacted the first state takeover statute in 1968. VA. CODE ANN § 13.1-528-541 (1978).
Thirty-six other states subsequently enacted similar statutes. See ALASKA STAT. §§
45.57.010-.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264-1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 11-51.5-101-108 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-457-468 (West

Supp. 1984);

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1982);

(West Supp. 1978)(repealed 1979); GA.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§§ 517.35-.363

§§ 22-1901-1915 (1977 & Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501-1513 (1980 & Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 /2,
137.521 (Supp. 1983-84) (repealed by Act No. 83-365, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628
CODE ANN.
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two-tiered takeovers which use high pressure and coercive techniques.' 8 In the first step of a two-tier takeover, an aggressor corporation 9 makes a tender offer 2" for a limited amount of time to buy a
certain percentage of the target corporation's 2 voting stock at a
specified price (usually above market).2 The result is that many
shareholders rush to sell their shares fearing that after the tender
offer, the price they will receive for their shares will be less.22 The
(West)); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1-3.1-11 (West Supp. 1983-84); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 502.211-.215 (West Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276-1284 (1981); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560-.991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1982); LA REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-1512 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801817 (Supp. 1983-84); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901-908 (Supp. 1983);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (West Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West
Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101-121 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401-2417 (1977); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1979) (amended 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1-:15
(Supp. 1983) (amended 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1-:19 (West Supp. 1983-84);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
78B-1-11 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Baldwin 1979) (amended 1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431-450 (West Supp. 1983-84); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§
71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10-110 (Law Co-op Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1-47 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 482101-2114 (1979 & Supp. 1983); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 129 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 61-4-1-13 (1978) (repealed 1983); and WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West

Special Pamphlet 1983). See also Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or CorporateLaw Concepts?, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 3, 5
n.16 (1984) (giving a tabular breakdown of statutes and provisions).
18. Warren, supra note 9, at 696 (criticizing the two-tiered offer as being both
coercive and manipulative). See also Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The
Legal Propriety Of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV.
977, 1003 (1983).
19. An aggressor corporation is the corporation which is attempting to acquire
the target corporation through buying a controlling interest in the target corporation's stock. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 601-03 (2d ed. 1981).
20. The tender offer is a publicly made offer to the target corporation's shareholders for them to tender or sell their shares to the aggressor corporation at a speci-

fied price. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973).
21. The target corporation is the corporation that the aggressor is attempting to
acquire, usually without the present management's approval.
22. For example in 1969, Chris-Craft publicly announced a cash tender offer for
up to 300,000 shares of Piper at $65 per share which was $12 above the then current
market price. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 5 (1977).
23. Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1361-62 (1978) (discussing how disclosure in tender offers has a whipsaw
effect whereby shareholders rush to sell their shares even though they may not be
satisfied with the terms); Greene, Corporate Freezeout Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 509 (1976) (discussing how minority shareholders are compelled to participate in tender offers for fear of being pushed out in a subsequent
merger at less desirable terms); Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The

Application Of Federal And State Law To An Innovative Corporate Acquisition
Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 403-13 (1982) [hereinafter Front-End Loaded
Tender Offers] (discussing the coercive effect of two-tiered offers); Note, FairnessIn

Freezeout Transactions: Observations on Coping with Going Private Problems, 69
Ky. L.J. 77, 85 (1980-81) (discussing the coerciveness of tender offers).
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goal of the aggressor corporation is to acquire voting control of the
target corporation.
In the second step of a two-tiered takeover, the aggressor corporation votes its nominees onto the target corporation's board of directors. The newly elected directors then approve a merger or consolidation of the two corporations. The remaining minority shareholders of the target corporation are then given an opportunity to
either sell their shares or to exchange them for the aggressor corporation's stock,24 often resulting in less value per share than the
tender offer price.2 The result, therefore, is that the remaining minority shareholders receive less for their shares than the shares are
worth. 6
In order to protect the shareholders in these tender offers, Congress has enacted the Williams Act.27 The Williams Act requires
tender offerors to make "full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case."28 Essentially,
the Williams Act requires a tender offeror to file a disclosure statement 29 with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C.") at
the time it commences its tender offer.30 Copies of the statement are
given to the target corporation,3 any competing bidders,3 2 and the
target corporation's shareholders. 3 The statement discloses the offeror's identity, 4 source of funds to be used, 35 amount of funds
available,36 offeror's current holdings of the target corporation's
shares,37 and any plans the offeror has to liquidate, merge, or change
the nature of the target corporation. 8
24. The principal difference between a cash offer and a public exchange offer is
that the shareholder receives an interest in the aggressor corporation rather than

cash.

HAMILTON, CORPORATIONs

25.

605 (2d. ed. 1981).

See Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (stating

that tender offers are coercive because shareholders are forced to sell their shares in
the tender offer stage or risk getting less in the subsequent merger).
26. Target shareholders who fail to tender in the first step should expect to
receive less than the tender offer. Front-End Loaded Tender Offers, supra note 23,
at 406.
27.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).

28. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.

CODE

& AD. ADMIN. NEws 2811, 2813.
29. Offerors seeking to acquire five percent or more of a publicly held corporation's shares must file a schedule 14D-1 with the Securities Exchange Commission. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)(1) (1986).
31. Id.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1984).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
34. Id. § 78m(d)(1).
35. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).
38. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
CONG.
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In an attempt to protect the tendering shareholders, the Williams Act also regulates the procedures of the offer." It requires a
fixed withdrawal date,'0 pro rata purchasing of shares if more shares
are tendered than desired,"' minimum time periods for the tender
offer,' 3 equalization of the price paid for all shares in the offer,'3 and
the prohibition of fraudulent or deceptive practices during the
offer.

44

Congress designed the Williams Act to protect the target corporation's shareholders 4 while remaining completely neutral with regard to. the offeror and target corporation's management. 6 The Williams Act purports not to favor either party nor to promote or
inhibit takeovers. In reality, however, commentators have recognized
that the Williams Act favors the aggressor corporation. 7 To
counteract this effect, most states have enacted statutes that further
8
regulate the first step of a takeover.'
The United States Supreme Court called the constitutionality
39. The Williams Act authorizes the S.E.C. to enact rules and procedures to
supplement its provisions. Id. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1). Consequently, some of the
procedures are enumerated in S.E.C. regulations as well as the Williams Act. See id.
40. Tendering shareholders may withdraw their tendered shares at any time
within seven days or after sixty days from the date of the original offer. Id. §
78n(d)(5); See also 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7 (1986).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). If more shares are tendered than the percentage the aggressor offered to buy in its original offer, the aggressor is required to buy a
pro rata share of all shares tendered during the offer period rather than buying just
the first ones tendered. Id.; 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (1986) (exception to statutory pro
rata requirements). This requirement avoids some of the stampeding effect of a
tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6); 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (1986).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1986).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). If the offeror increases the price offered for
shares at any time during the tender offer all tendering shareholders, including those
who tendered before the price increase, receive the increased price for their shares.
44. Id. § 78n(e).
45. The principal purpose of the Williams Act is to protect investors. Edgar v.
Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1981); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S., 26-29
(1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. § 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2811, 2813-14; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
46. Senator Harrison Williams stated that the Williams Act was intended to
protect investors without encouraging or discouraging tender offers. 113 CONG. REC.
24,664 (1967). The Act was drafted "to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of
management or in favor of the . . . tender offer[or]." Id. See also MITE, 457 U.S. at
633 (the Court held that neutrality and investor purposes are intertwined and indistinguishable); Piper, 430 U.S. at 29-30 (the Court noted that neutrality was a characteristic of the Williams Act); Warren, supra note 9, at 675-79 (discussing the Williams
Act, its provision, and its neutrality intentions).
47. See Sell, A CriticalAnalysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 474-75 (1984); Kjellenberg, The Illinois
Business Corporation's Act of 1983, 1985 Amendments, IICLE Seminar on Officers'
and Directors' Liability, § 7.85, at 2 (May 29, 1986). See also Scriggins & Clarke,
supra note 7, at 286-89 (noting that the offeror has all of the advantages in tender
offers).
48. See supra note 17.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:87

of the first generation of these statutes into question when it found

the Illinois Takeover Act ("Illinois Act") unconstitutional in Edgar
v. MITE."' The Court found that the Illinois Act's regulation of the
first step of a takeover was unconstitutional under the Supremacy
and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. 0 Further,
the Court held that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act,
thereby rendering it unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause."
The Illinois Act substantially frustrated the objectives of the
Williams Act because it imposed procedural and/or substantive requirements directly on the tender offeror.52 The Illinois Act's provision allowing the Secretary of State to hold hearings substituted the
judgment of an administrative official for that of investors in determining the fairness of a tender offer.5" Additionally, the precommencement notice and hearing requirements favored management
through providing a delay during which they could develop defen-

sive tactics. 4
49. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646. MITE casts a shadow over all state anti-takeover
laws and is the subject of several articles. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term,
96 HARv. L. REV. 62 (1982); Note, State Takeover Statutes Under Attack - Casualties in the Battle for Corporate Control - MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE PAUL L. REV.
989 (1981).
50. MITE, 457 U.S. at 629-46. The Court's opinion held that the Act was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 643-46. Only Justice White found
that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 630-40
(White, J., concurring). Justice Powell and Stevens found that Congress' policy of
neutrality in the Williams Act is not tantamount to a federal prohibition against state
legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent management. Id. at
646-47 (Powell & Stevens, J.J., concurring). Justices O'Connor, Marshall, Brennan
and Rehnquist did not reach the issue. Id. at 647-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Marshall, Brennan & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 631-40.
52. The Illinois Act required an offeror to file a precommencement notice
twenty days prior to the offer becoming effective. Id. at 634-35. The Act allowed the
Secretary of State to call a hearing with respect to a tender offer. Id. at 637. The offer
could not proceed until that hearing was completed. Id. Additionally, the Act allowed
the Secretary of State to pass judgment on the fairness of the tender offer. Id. at 639.
53. Under the Illinois Act, the Secretary of State was allowed to pass on the
fairness of an offer and deny registration of the offer if he found it inequitable. Id.
Justice White's opinion found that this allowed the Secretary of State to substitute
his judgment for that of the investor. Id. This was unconstitutional because the Williams Act was designed to allow investors to be free to make decisions themselves
once they have learned of the relevant facts and have had a fair opportunity in which
to decide. Id. at 639-40 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813).
54. During the 20-day precommencement notification period, the offeror could
not communicate with the shareholders, but the target corporation could disseminate
information to the shareholders on the impending offer. Id. at 635-36. Additionally,
the hearing provisions allowed the Secretary of State to call a hearing at any time
prior to commencement of the offer with no deadlines for the period in which to
complete this hearing. Id. at 637. Justice White found that these provisions caused
delays which the target corporation could use to its benefit. Id. Congress has recognized that a delay can seriously impede a tender offer. Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, Leroy v. Great
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The legislative history of the Williams Act clearly shows that it
was intended to protect shareholders by allowing them to have full
disclosure with which to decide upon the fairness of an offer, and to
remain completely neutral with regard to the aggressor and target
corporations." The Illinois Act's hearing requirement interfered
with the shareholder's ability to decide upon the fairness of a tender
offer. The Illinois Act also favored management by allowing them
delay time to develop and implement defense tactics. The Illinois
Act was unconstitutional, therefore, because it frustrated the shareholder protection and neutrality objectives of the Williams Act."
The Illinois Act was unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause because it imposed burdens5 7 on interstate commerce that
were excessive in light of Illinois' local interests. 8 The Illinois Act
regulated all corporations that had their principal executive offices
in Illinois or had at least ten percent of their security holders residing in Illinois." The Illinois Act, therefore, could be applied to regulate tender offers which did not affect a single Illinois shareholder

nor an Illinois corporation. 0 The Court's opinion in MITE specifically noted that the "nationwide" reach of the Illinois Act unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause. 61 Illinois' asserted interests in protecting resident security holders and regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations did not justify the burden on nonresident shareholders or
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). A delay is a potent weapon in a tender offer
fight because it enables a target company to arrange and implement various defensive
techniques to thwart the tender offer's success. Brief for Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10, n.8, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 636 (1982).
See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977) (characterizing delay as a potent
weapon in tender offers).
55. See supra notes 45-46.
56. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631-40.
57. Id. at 643. The Court found that the Illinois Act burdened interstate commerce through its "nationwide reach" which gave Illinois the power to determine
whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere. Id. This could result in the shareholders being deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, thereby hindering the reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use. Id.
58. Id. at 644. Illinois claimed two legitimate local interests to justify the Illinois Act. Id. Illinois claimed that the Act was intended to protect resident security
holders and also that the Act regulated the internal affairs of Illinois corporations, a
legitimate area of state regulation. Id.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 '/2, V 137.52-10(2) (1979), repealed by Act No. 83-365,
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).
60. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642. Theoretically, the Illinois Act could be applied to an
aggressor corporation's tender offer for a corporation organized and located outside of
Illinois and in which no Illinois shareholder tendered any shares. The Act, therefore,
would be regulating transactions which were completely outside of Illinois and which
did not involve an Illinois resident.
61. Id. at 644. The Court found that Illinois had no legitimate interests in protecting nonresident shareholders. Id.
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corporations. 62
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, numerous lower courts invalidated the first generation of takeover statutes.6" Some states enacted a second generation of statutes to regulate takeovers.6 4 Although some of these statutes mirrored previous
disclosure statutes, most attempted to fit within the loopholes the
Court had left in the MITE decision."B Most of these types of second
generation statutes, when challenged, were found unconstitutional.6 6
A few of these new statutes regulated the second or merger step of
the two-tier takeover.6 7 Illinois' recent Amendment to the Business
Corporation Act is one of these second generation fair-price statutes
that regulates the second step or business combination of a take-

over, after a tender offer has been successful.
62. Id. at 645. The Court was unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially
enhanced the shareholders' position. Id. Additionally, the Court did not believe Illinois' proposed justifications of protecting local interests because the Act could be
applied to foreign corporations and nonresident shareholders. Id. These burdens on
out-of-state commerce were excessive in light of the questionable interests asserted.
Id. at 645-46.
63. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Servs. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir.
1983) (Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act found unconstitutional); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act found
unconstitutional); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.
1982) (Michigan Take-Over Offers Act found unconstitutional); National City Lines,
Inc., v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure
Act found unconstitutional); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522
(D. Md. 1982) (Maryland Corporate Takeover Laws found unconstitutional); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire Security Takeover Disclosure Act found unconstitutional); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768
(Ky. 1982) (Kentucky Take-Over Bids. Disclosure Act found unconstitutional).
64. See, e.g, HAw. REV. STAT. § 417E-1(1985); MINN. STAT. §§ 80B.01 (1984); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 351.407 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 (Anderson
Supp. 1985).
65. Justice Powell noted in his concurrence that the Court's opinion in part V-B
regarding the Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause left some room for
state regulation of tender offers. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646. See also Block, Barton &
Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 332
(1986) (discussing how the MITE decision marked the end of the first generation
state takeover statutes).
66. One statute has withstood constitutional scrutiny in part. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (court declared the Minnesota
Takeover Act constitutional). See infra note 115 for a discussion of the court's analysis of the Minnesota Takeover Act. Others have not withstood constitutional challenges. See, e.g., APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.
Minn. 1985) (declaring the Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act unconstitutional); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Miss. 1985) (declaring the Missouri
Control Share Acquisition Statute unconstitutional).
67. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-366 (1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-232 (Supp
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 271A.397 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:132 (West Supp. 1985); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601
(1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS
(Purdon Supp. 1983).

§§

21.200(776) (1985); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§

1409.1, 1910
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THE AMENDMENT TO THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

The actual Amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation
Act,6 8 though short, is detailed and confusing at first reading. Accordingly, an explanation of its major provisions and definitions is
necessary. First, the Amendment applies only to domestic Illinois
corporations 9 whose securities are registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.70 The major requirement of the Amendment
is a super-majority vote of eighty percent of all outstanding voting
shares and a majority of the voting shares of disinterested share72
holders71 to bring about five different business combinations.
These business combinations are: 1) any merger, consolidation or
share exchange with any interested shareholder's (one who owns
more than ten percent of the outstanding voting shares);4 2) any
sale, lease, transfer, etc., of any assets of the corporation to an interested shareholder equalling ten percent or more of the corporate net
worth;" 3) any issuance or transfer of any securities to any interested shareholder;76 4) the adoption of any interested shareholder's
plan or proposal to liquidate or dissolve the corporation; 77 and 5)
any reclassification of securities which increases the proportionate
amount of any interested shareholder's portion of shares.78
The Amendment lists two exceptions to the super-majority vote
requirement.7 The first exception occurs when the business combination receives a two-thirds vote of approval of the disinterested directors.80 A disinterested director is one who: is neither an interested
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 7.85 (1985).
69. A domestic Illinois corporation is one which is incorporated under the laws
of Illinois.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 7.85 A. The Amendment also applies to any other
domestic Illinois corporation which specifically adopts the Amendment into its articles of incorporation. Id. Once the Amendment is adopted, a vote of 80% of the outstanding shares, and a majority vote of the disinterested shares is required to amend
or repeal the provision. Id.
71. A disinterested shareholder is a "shareholder ... who is not an interested
shareholder [nor] an affiliate or an associate of an interested shareholder." Id. 1 C(9).
72. Id. A(1)(a)-(e).
73. Id. I A(1)(a).
74. Id. C(2)(a). The definition also includes any affiliate or associate of the
Illinois corporation that was the owner of ten percent or more of the outstanding
voting shares within two years prior to the date of the proposed business combination. Id. C(2)(b).
75. Id. A(1)(b).
76. Id. A(1)(c).
77. Id. The definition also includes any plan in which the interested shareholder
will receive anything other than cash. Id.
78. Id. A(1)(e).
79. Id. B(1)-(2). When one of these exceptions is met, the higher vote requirement is not required for the approval of any of the business combinations. Id. Only
the affirmative vote as required by law, or outlined in the corporation's articles of
incorporation, is required. Id.
80. Id. B(1).
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shareholder nor an affiliate or associate of an interested shareholder;8 ' was a member of the board before the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder, or was made a member
through the majority vote of disinterested directors; 2 and was not
nominated as a director by an interested shareholder.8 3
The second exception occurs when certain fair price requirements and procedures are followed.81 The requirements concern the
price offered for shareholder's shares not tendered during the first
step of the takeover. The statute lists two different methods for determining the fair price of a share, depending on whether the share
is common stock s or all other series of stocks.8 ' For common stock,
the price received in the second step or business combination must
be equal to or higher than the highest 7 of either the highest price
the interested shareholder paid for any share in the first step,88 or
the fair market value of the share. 8 For all other series of stocks,"
the price received in the second step must be equal to or higher than
the highest of four prices.8 1 These four prices are determined as follows: 1) the highest price the interested shareholder paid for that
type of stock in the first step;92 2) the highest preferential amount
81. Id. C(7)(a).
82. Id. C(7)(b). Either of these two requirements may be met to fulfill this
part of the definition. Id.
83. Id. C(7)(c). All three of the requirements listed must be met to be a disinterested director. Id. B(2).
84. Id. B(2)(a)-(f). All of the conditions listed must be met to fulfill the exception. Id.
85. Id. B(2)(a)(1)-(2).
86. Id. B(2)(b)(1)-(4).
87. The interested shareholder must pay the highest of either the price found
through the price paid provision or that found through the fair market value provision. Id. B(2)(a)(1)-(2).
88. The highest price the interested shareholder paid is the highest price paid
for any share bought within two years prior to the first public announcement of the
proposed business combination, or the highest price paid for any share in the transaction in which the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder (acquired
ten percent or more of the outstanding voting stock), whichever is higher. Id.
B(2)(a)(1).
89. The fair market value of the share is the fair market on the first trading day
after the day the business combination was announced, or the fair market value on
the first trading date after the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder, whichever is higher. Id. B(2)(a)(2).
90. This provision would apply to all other series of stocks than common, such
as preferred stock. Usually these other series of stocks are non-voting and receive
preferential treatment in dividends and liquidation. This provision also applies even
if the interested shareholder did not previously acquire any shares of that classification of stock. Id. B(2)(a)(2)(b).
91. The interested shareholder must pay the highest price of the four determined prices for any share of that series of stock. Id.
92. This is the highest price paid for a share (if applicable) that was bought
within a two-year period prior to the announcement of the business combination, or
the highest price paid (if applicable) in the transaction in which the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder. Id. 1 B(2)(b)(1).
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received per share if the corporation is liquidated;" 3) the fair market value;9' or 4) the result of multiplying the number found in the
fair market provision by a ratio.9"
To fulfill the fair price exception, it is also required that certain
conditions be met in addition to the price requirements." The
shares must be purchased with the same form of consideration the
interested shareholder used to acquire his other shares. 97 Additionally, the exception forbids: 9 certain dividends from being withheld, 99 the reduction of dividends, 10 0 the reclassification of stock if it
reduces the number of outstanding shares without an increase of
dividends,' 01 and2 the interested shareholder's acquisition of any ad0
1

ditional shares.

The fair price exception also forbids the interested shareholder
from receiving any loans, advances, or other financial assistance
from the corporation in anticipation of the business combination.103
Additionally, a proxy or information statement that complies with
the S.E.C. regulations1 0 ' must be sent out thirty days prior to the
93. This is the highest preferential amount (if applicable) the shareholder
would receive in the event of any voluntary or involuntary liquidation or dissolution.
Id. 1 B(2)(b)(2).
94. The fair market value is determined in the same manner as for common
stock. Id. B(2)(b)(3). See supra note 89.
95. The ratio is determined as follows: x = the highest price the interested
shareholder paid for that type of share within a two-year period prior to the announcement of the business combination; y = the market value on the first day in
that two-year period on which the interested shareholder acquired any shares of that
type. Id.
B(2)(b)(4).
96. Id. B(c)-(f).
97. The consideration involved must be cash if the interested shareholder paid
in cash. Id. B(c). If the interested shareholder paid in various ways, the consideration must be in cash, or in the form used to acquire the largest amount of such stock.
Id.
98. The prohibitions must be adhered to in the period between when the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder and the business combination
date. Id. B(d).
99. There can be no failure to pay dividends on stock other than common stock
unless it is first approved by a two-thirds vote of disinterested directors. Id.
100. There can be no reduction in the annual rate of dividends on common
stock unless it is approved by a two-thirds vote of disinterested directors or is covered under the reclassification provision. Id.
101. If the stock is reclassified or reorganized in such a way that it reduces the
number of outstanding common shares, then there must be an increase in the annual
rate of dividends to prevent any reduction to common shareholders. Id.
102. The interested shareholder must not have acquired any more voting shares
after becoming an interested shareholder. Id.
103. The interested shareholder cannot have received (except proportionately
as a shareholder) directly or indirectly any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges, or
other financial assistance, or any tax credits or tax advantages from the corporation
in anticipation of the business combination. Id.
B(2)(e).
104. The S.E.C. rules require that a proxy solicitation be accompanied by a
proxy statement containing information set forth in schedule 14A. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-3(a) (1986). The information required depends on the type of issue involved.
Id.
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business combination regardless of whether the S.E.C. requires
one.10 5 The fair price requirements and procedures are intended to
protect the minority shareholders from receiving less value for their
shares than those shareholders who sold their shares in the initial
tender offer.
The other section added to the Illinois Business Corporations
Act with the Amendment is the Directors' Duties Provision. It addresses the duties that directors must follow when carrying out their
responsibilities.'0 " It allows them to consider the best interests of
the corporation in making decisions. It also allows them to consider
the effects of any actions upon employees, suppliers, and customers
of the corporation, as well as0 the
communities in which the offices of
7
the corporation are located.1

III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AMENDMENT

If challenged, the Amendment to the Illinois Business Corporations Act will withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Amendment
does not contain any of the provisions of the original Illinois Takeover Act which were found unconstitutional.' The Amendment is
constitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it regulates the
second step of a takeover as compared to the Williams Act, which
regulates the first step. 09 It also is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it does not place an excessive burden on interstate commerce in light of the local benefits it creates." 0
The Williams Act- does not preempt the Amendment, thereby
rendering it unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause."' The
Williams Act only regulates the tender offer" 2 and not the merger or
business combination after the offer is successful. The Amendment,
on the other hand, only regulates the second or merger step of a
takeover."' Additionally, the Amendment does not contain any of
105.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,

7.85 B(2)(f) (1985).

106. Id. 1 8.85.
107. The provision allows the directors, in considering the best interests of the
corporation, to also consider the effects of any action upon the employees, suppliers,
customers and communities in which the corporation is located as well as all other

pertinent factors. Id.
108. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
111. See Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be, 89 DICK. L. REv. 401, 428-31 (1985) (concluding that the Pennsylvania Fair Price Statute is not preempted by the Williams
Act because it contains none of the provisions found in MITE and because it regulates the second step of a takeover).
112.

The Williams Act does not regulate mergers, sales of assets or dissolutions.

For a discussion of the Williams Act, see supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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the specific provisions that were found to conflict with the Williams
Act in MITE."' It does not require any precommencement notice,
waiting period or hearings, and does not substitute the judgment of
a state official on the fairness of an offer for that of the shareholder. 1 The Amendment regulates management's fiduciary duties,
the relationships of the shareholders to the corporation, and the relationships of the shareholders among themselves. 6 This regulation
of the internal affairs of a corporation is a traditional area of state
law that the Williams Act does not address. 7
An argument could be made, however, that the Amendment is
contrary to the Williams Act's policy of neutrality because the target
corporation can use the Amendment to fend off the second step of a
take-over." 8 The Amendment can be used to deter the completion
of a two-step takeover in several ways. First, the fair price requirements will relieve the pressure on shareholders to sell their shares in
the tender offer because they realize that they will receive the same
price for them later."' This could make the completion of a tender
offer more difficult to accomplish and would favor the target corporation's management.2 0 The possibility of this favoring effect, however, is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. It would be difficult to
prove that an aggressor corporation's tender offer was unsuccessful
due solely to the Amendment's fair price requirements when there
are a variety of factors that can affect the success of a tender offer. 12 ' Additionally, two Supreme Court Justices have stated that
114. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
115. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984). In
upholding the Minnesota Act as constitutional, the Cardiff court found that the Act
was materially different in scope and application from the Illinois statute in MITE.
Id. at 909-10. Specifically, the Minnesota Statute did not contain a precommencement notice period, did not delay the tender offer, and did not allow the state commissioner to pass on the fairness of an offer. Id. at 910-11. Illinois' Amendment also
does not contain any of these provisions. Additionally, it is even more different in
scope than the Minnesota statute because it applies to the second step of a takeover
only, whereas the Minnesota statute applied to the first.
116. The internal affairs of a corporation are "matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders." MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
117. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
118. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 65, at 353.
119. Fair Price Requirements will enable shareholders to resist tendering their
shares in the initial offer since later price offers will be as high. See Newlin & Gilmer,
supra note 8, at 121. Also, the requirements prevent the target corporation from being acquired at a bargain price by squeezing out the remaining shareholders through
consolidation, merger or sale of assets. Id. See also Front-End Loaded Tender Offers,
supra note 23, at 407 (noting that equal consideration in a two step takeover gives
the shareholders too little incentive to tender in the first step); Gilson, The Case
Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling
Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775, 786-92 (April 1982) (discussing the effects of fair price
deterrents).
120. See supra note 18.
121. After a tender offer has been commenced, the target corporation's manage-

100
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the Williams Act's neutrality policy does not imply a congressional
intent to prohibit all state regulation of tender offers, even if the
state regulation protects the incumbent management. 1 2 It is unlikely, therefore, that the Amendment would be found unconstitutional as inhibiting tender offers on this basis.

Second, the Amendment can also be used to deter a takeover
because it makes the second step more difficult to accomplish due to
the burden of acquiring a supermajority vote or the meeting of the
fair price requirements.' The target corporation's management can
use the Amendment to make it difficult for the aggressor corporation to complete a takeover. This possible use as a defense, however,
is in the second step or business combination and not the tender

offer. The Williams Act's position of neutrality lies in the regulation
of tender offers and does not extend beyond that step. The Amendment does not contain any provisions which favor management in
the tender offer step."2 4 Any favoritism, therefore, would not be unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it would occur,
if at all, in a step or action that the Williams Act does not regulate.2' The Amendment cannot be said, therefore, to frustrate the
26
objectives of the Williams Act.1
Additionally, the main purpose of the Williams Act is to protect
shareholders in takeover situations. 27 The purpose of the Amendment is to protect the minority shareholders and not to protect the
ment can use several defense tactics to thwart the success of the tender offer. They
can: 1) drive up the market price of the target's shares so the offer will be unattractive; 2) issue additional treasury or previously unissued shares and place them in
friendly hands, thereby diluting the aggressor's position; 3) find a more congenial
suitor (white knight); 4) buy off the aggressor corporation or persuade it to withdraw
its offer; or even 5) litigate. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 642 (2d. ed. 1980). See also E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-202 (1977) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS] (discussing defensive tactics to thwart a tender offer). Because some or all of these tactics
are usually employed, it would be impossible to determine the effect on the tender
offer of the shark repellent Illinois Amendment.
122. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 65, at 354.
123. Supermajority voting provisions will raise the offeror's cost of acquiring
control and make a takeover more difficult to accomplish. See Newlin & Gilmer,
supra note 8, at 121.
124. See supra notes 114-15.
125. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 7, at 289 (concluding that the Maryland Fair Price Act would be constitutional because it does not frustrate the time and
informational objectives of the Williams Act and because it regulates an entirely different transaction).
126. In reality, the Amendment furthers the objectives of the Williams Act because it allows shareholders to make more rational judgments regarding their shares
due to the removal of the coercive influences. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 7, at
289 (reviewing the constitutionality of the Maryland Fair Price Act); Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 8, at 122.
127. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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target corporation's management.1 2 8 It is unlikely, therefore, that
the Amendment's possible use as a defense for the target corporation will render it unconstitutional.
The Amendment would be found constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it furthers legitimate state interests without
unnecessarily burdening interstate trade. When a state regulation is
challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, courts apply a balancing
test. 129 They determine whether the burden imposed on interstate
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the legitimate state interest the statute effectuates. 3 0 Courts have already determined
that protecting resident investors' and regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations are legitimate state interests.' 2
Courts have also recognized, however, that halting or discouraging
takeovers, 3 lowering the initial price offered to shareholders,3 4 or
depriving shareholders of a premium for their shares are burdens on
interstate commerce. 3 ' The Amendment, however, is constitutional
because it does not result in the decreasing of initial offers or the
depriving shareholders of a premium for their shares. Although the
Amendment might be used to discourage takeovers, it is nevertheless constitutional under the Commerce Clause because the Amendment's interests in protecting local investors and regulating the internal affairs of Illinois corporations outweigh this incidental
burden.
The Amendment applies only to domestic Illinois corpora128. See supra note 9.
129. The general rule is that "where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The test is one of degree depending on the nature of the
local interest involved. Id. See also Developments in Tender Offers, supra note 121,
at 229-33.
130. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
131. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644; Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1417.
132. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (federal courts should refer to state
law to determine whether independent directors have power to terminate derivative
suits brought under the federal securities laws); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977) (determining that the plaintiff's sole remedy for an "unfair" transaction
was under state corporate law); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (in deference to state
corporate law, a cause of action will not be implied from a federal statute in the
absence of an express command from Congress). See also Sargent, On the Validity of
State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIo ST. L.J.
689, 724-27 (1981); Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 7, at 290.
133. Mesa Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983);
Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
134. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
135. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
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tions. 18' The Amendment does not, therefore, have the "nationwide
reach" that the Court found unconstitutional in MITE.'37 The
Amendment does not regulate securities exchanges outside of Illinois.'"8 It regulates the internal corporate activities of Illinois corporations in various business combinations. 18 9 Because it does not affect or apply to a tender offer,140 it cannot have the effect of
decreasing an aggressor corporation's initial offer to shareholders.
Additionally, the Amendment is designed to insure that all shareholders, including those who did not tender their shares in the first
step, will receive the highest value for their shares. 1 Consequently,
it cannot be said to deprive shareholders of a premium for their
shares. The Amendment, therefore, is not unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause for burdening interstate commerce in either of
these ways.
Although the Amendment might be used to discourage interstate takeovers, thereby burdening interstate commerce, this burden
is not excessive in relation to Illinois' legitimate state interests. Illinois has a legitimate interest in protecting resident shareholders and
regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations. Because
neither Congress nor the courts have federalized corporate law, great
deference is afforded states in regulating the internal affairs of corporations. 48 The jurisdictional basis of a state's regulation affects
the weight given to its internal affairs interest. ' A statute applicable only to corporations incorporated in the regulating state most
clearly shows a state's internal affairs' interest.'
The Amendment is constitutional as a regulation of internal af136. See supra note 69.
137. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
138. In MITE, the Court reasoned that a tender offer was for the transfer of
stock by a stockholder to a third person and did not, therefore, involve the internal
affairs of a corporation. Id. at 645. The Amendment does not regulate tender offers or
exchanges of stock. Rather, it regulates the business combinations between the corporation and its majority shareholder and the effects of those combinations on the corporation's shareholders. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing
five business combinations affected).
139. Courts have noted that there is a distinction between regulating the acquisition of shares and regulating the use of power once the shares have been acquired.
MITE, 457 U.S. at 645. The latter can be a proper subject for state regulation. Id.
140. The key to understanding the constitutionality of the Amendment is that
it does not regulate the initial tender offer stage of a takeover at all. It regulates the
second or business combination step which directly concerns the corporation's internal affairs. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 7, at 286. (examining the constitutionality of the Maryland Fair Price Act).
141. See supra note 9.
142. State regulation of internal affairs has been protected from federalization.
See supra notes 138-39. See also McDaniel, supra note 111, at 417.
143. See Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH & LEE L. REV. 733, 752
(1979). See also McDaniel, supra note 111, at 417.
144. See supra note 143.
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fairs because it regulates Illinois corporations only. 4" Illinois clearly
has a legitimate state interest in regulating its own state-created
corporations and, therefore, would be given deference in that regulation."" Additionally, the Amendment is constitutional under the internal affairs doctrine because it regulates the second, forced transaction stage of a takeover. 147 The business combinations the
Amendment covers directly concern the target corporation's internal
affairs."14 The internal affairs of a corporation are matters peculiar
to the relationships among the corporation and its current officers,
directors, and shareholders." 9 The Illinois Amendment regulates the
relationships between the shareholders and the Illinois corporation,
and among the shareholders themselves. 5 ' It clearly regulates the
internal affairs of Illinois corporations and, therefore, is not an excessive burden on commerce in relation to this important legitimate
state interest.!
IV.

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS THE AMENDMENT POSES

Although the Illinois Amendment would pass a constitutional
challenge, it does pose some interesting problems in that, unlike
most takeover statutes, it can be applied to many internal corporate
activities other than takeovers. A close inspection of the defined
business combinations reveals that the supermajority vote is required in a number of various corporate activities involving a majority shareholder other than the second step of a takeover. These potential applications may conflict with established corporate policy.
This potential use could interfere because it would require the
supermajority vote or fair price provisions to be followed before the
business can be transacted. 5'
In keeping with the Amendment's purpose to protect the minority shareholders, these additional applications are advantageous to
the minority shareholders. A requirement of a supermajority vote in
transactions with a majority shareholder will give the minority
shareholders more rights and protections than they would have had
before the Amendment.' The Amendment, however, allows an ex145. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 68-71.
152. In the usual corporate situation, if a minority shareholder is dissatisfied
with management's policies or proposals, his only choice of action is to sell his shares

or to wage a proxy fight.

HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS

492 (2d ed. 1980). Because the

minority shareholder's proportion of the voting stock is so small, his voice through
voting his shares is small. Under the Illinois Amendment, a majority vote of all disin-
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ception to its supermajority voting requirements with a two-thirds
vote of disinterested directors. ss It is unlikely, therefore, that its
application to other transactions will interfere with everyday corpo-

rate business.
The Directors' Duties Provision also poses some problems because it contains language that can be read to expand the Board of

Directors' duties.15' The Courts have fashioned a well-recognized
duty of care that a director owes to the corporation.' 55 Traditionally,

these duties have been held to be owed only to the corporation. Few
states have adopted specific statutes providing this or any standard

of care and have instead left the determination of the standard up
to the judiciary. 15" This section begins to codify these duties in statutory form. Ironically, this part of the section includes language that
allows the directors to consider the effects of their actions on the
employees and communities of the corporation.157 The language
might be construed to be an expansion of the traditional duties of
directors. It is doubtful, however, that any court would read this
language to expand duties that have long been judicially determined
to constitute something else. If the language were interpreted this
way, however, the provision may be used to sue directors personally
for breaching their duties where the corporation's activities have led
to physical or financial harm to the corporation's employees or the
community in which it is located.
Despite the potential difficulties, however, the Amendment will
encourage new corporations to incorporate in Illinois due to the statutory protection it provides in the event of a hostile takeover.'5
terested shares is required to approve the five business combinations with a majority
shareholder. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. By reducing the proportion of voting shares to just disinterested shares, the minority shareholders voice has
increased proportionately. The minority shareholder, therefore, can have a voice in
voting on matters that he would not have had without the Amendment. See also
Freezeouts under the 1983 Illinois Business CorporationAct: The Need For Protection Of Minority Shareholders From "Going Private" Mergers, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 679,
693-97, 701-06 (1985) (discussing different devices designed to protect minority shareholders in the going private freezeout situation).
153. See supra note 80.
154. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
155. Traditional fiduciary duties of Directors require the exercise of sound business judgment, in utmost good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (Supreme Court considered the fiduciary duties of directors); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (leading case on the fiduciary duties of officers and directors). See also PIrr & HISTAND, 1
HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND

DI-

1983).
156. Kjellenberg, The Illinois Business Corporation'sAct of 1983, 1985 Amendments, IICLE Seminar on Officers' and Directors' Liability § 8.85, at 3 (May 29,
1986).
157. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
158. The Pennsylvania Act will encourage corporations to incorporate in Pennsylvania or domesticate there to receive the protection of the Act. See Newlin & GilRECTORS 9 (Supp.
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This is advantageous because it will increase corporate activity in
Illinois, thereby increasing state revenue through incorporation fees
and taxes. Additionally, present corporations will want to adopt the
Amendment into their by-laws to discourage attempted corporate
takeovers.' The Amendment, therefore, which was designed to protect minority shareholders, may wind up as a corporate tool used to
fend off hostile takeovers. This potential use as a takeover defense is
beneficial, however, because hostile takeovers are not necessarily in
the target corporation's interest or in the public interest.6 0
CONCLUSION

The Amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation Act is
part of a new trend in state regulation to protect minority shareholders by requiring a supermajority vote to bring about the second
step of a takeover. The Amendment would pass a constitutional
challenge because the Williams Act does not preempt it, and the
Amendment does not place an unnecessary burden on interstate
commerce. The Amendment might pose some problems for corporations, however, in transactions other than takeovers. In all, the
Amendment should encourage corporations to incorporate in Illinois
to acquire this built-in statutory protection against hostile takeovers. The aggressor corporation will be more hesitant to attempt to
take over a target corporation if, once it has achieved its voting control, a supermajority or fairness requirement is necessary to complete the takeover. The Amendment is a good one, therefore, because it achieves its goal of protection for minority shareholders and
also discourages hostile takeovers of Illinois corporations.
Valerie Ann Hall
mer, supra note 8, at 122.
159. Shark repellents are state statutes designed to discourage unwanted takeovers. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 627 (2d ed. 1981). A shark repellent deters a takeover attempt by making the target less desirable and more difficult to acquire and,
therefore, encourages the shark or aggressor corporation to seek other prey. See Gilson, supra note 119, at 776-77. For further discussions of shark repellents, see E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 223 (1973); DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 121, at 194-96; P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST
UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS 2 (1977); Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter
Provisions:Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699
(1979); Cohen, Takeover Bids: How Target Companies Fight Back, Jan.-Feb. 1970, at
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